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Gundlach: Dedication: Right of Legislature to Abrogate Park Dedications
CASE COMMENTS
sections in which a large portion of the population vehemently disapproves of interracial marriages, would certainly be a valid legislative
objective.
In California, where only 2% of the population is Negro, opposition
to this type of marriage may not be sufficiently strong to provide a valid
basis for such a statute. This is indicated by California's lenient attitude
toward miscegenous marriages even before the present case. Yet in
many of the other twenty-nine jurisdictions prohibiting these marriages
the fact that 25% to 50% of the population is Negro presents a difficult
social problem. In the light of existing public policy, anti-miscegenation
statutes in these states form part of the solution of the problem and should
be upheld.
PHn.Lip D. ANDERSON

DEDICATION:

RIGHT OF LEGISLATURE TO

ABROGATE PARK DEDICATIONS
Kramer v. Lakeland, 38 So.2d 126 (Fla. 1948)
The Lakeland Junior Chamber of Commerce obtained a permit from
the city to erect an information bureau in a public park. The plaintiffs,
taxpayers and residents of the City of Lakeland, brought suit against the
organization and the city, seeking to enjoin construction of the building.
The park had been dedicated in 1884 by recording a plat on which Block
14 was marked as a public square. A subsequent explanation of the
dedication by the grantor showed his intention to be that, in addition to
park purposes, any portion of the square could be used for a state, county,
or city building. In 1943 the successors of the original grantor conveyed
the fee sinlple to the city. In the proceedings below, the court held that
the city, holding the fee, could abrogate the use of the property as a park
and devote it to other public purposes. Plaintiffs appealed. HELD, the
city held title to the park in trust for the public and had no power to
appropriate, sell, or divert the land from the uses and purposes of its
original dedication without specific authorization by the Legislature; and
areas have considerable Negro population and allow commingling. Most Southern
areas, however, have a much larger ratio of Negro-white population and therefore a
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Section 167.09 of Florida Statutes 1941 did not give the required authorization. Judgment reversed.
Land dedications fall into two categories - common law and statutory.
For a common-law dedication no particular form or ceremony is necessary, the essential requirements being an offer of dedication and an acceptance thereof.' The common-law dedication acts not as a grant but
rather as an estoppel en pais, the fee remaining in the grantor 2 and the
public acquiring only an easement. It is generally held that the recording of a plat on which land is exhibited by blocks, streets, and a park,
marked as such, is a sufficient dedication. 3 Statutory dedications and
their legal effects are controlled wholly by the statute authorizing them,
and to make a valid dedication there must be a substantial compliance
with the requirements. In some states the statutory dedication operates as
a grant, with the fee passing to the governmental unit, 4 while in others
only an easement is created thereby. 5
The uses to which park property may be devoted depend largely upon
the manner of its acquisition, whether by dedication, purchase, or condemnation. 6 When dedication is the method, two questions are pertinent: was the dedication made with restrictions; 7 and, in whom does
the title rest? s Most of the cases substantially agree that the public,
with legislative authorization, can have a free hand in determining the
application of property dedicated to the public use without restrictions. 9
greater social problem.
'Hamilton v. Laesch, 134 Fla. 591, 184 So. 110 (1938); Seaboard A. L. Ry. v.
Dorsey, 111 Fla. 22, 149 So. 759 (1932); Weills v. Vero Beach, 96 Fla. 818, 119 So.
330 (1928); Miami v. Florida E. C. Ry., 79 Fla. 539, 84 So. 726 (1920).
2
Carter Oil Co. v. Myers, 105 F.2d 259 (C. C. A. 7th 1939); Burns v. McDaniel,
104 Fla. 526, 140 So. 314 (1932).
'Nash v. Pendleton, 183 Ark. 339, 35 S. W.2d 1002 (1931); Florida E. C. Ry. v.
Worley, 49 Fla. 297, 38 So. 618 (1905).
'St. Louis v. Koch, 335 Mo. 991, 74 S. W.2d 622 (1934); Neil v. Independent
Realty Co., 317 Mo. 1235, 298 S. W. 363 (1927); Menstell v. Johnson, 125 Ore. 150,
266 Pac. 891 (1928).
'Cloverdale Homes v. Town of Cloverdale, 182 Ala. 419, 62 So. 712 (1913);
Powell v. McKelvey, 56 Idaho 291, 53 P.2d 626 (1935).
'Slavich v. Hamilton, 201 Cal. 299, 257 Pac. 60 (1927); Harter v. City of San
Jose, 141 Cal. 659, 75 Pac. 344 (1904).
'McIntyre v. El Paso County, 15 Colo. App. 78, 61 Pac. 237 (1900); Daughters v.
Board of Riley County Comm'rs, 81 Kan. 548, 106 Pac. 297 (1910); Lowell v. Boston,
322 Mass. 709, 79 N. E.2d 713 (1948).
'Lake City v. Fulkerson, 122 Iowa 569, 98 N. W. 376 (1904); Brooklyn Park
Comm'rs v. Armstrong, 45 N. Y. 234 (1871).
"Daughters v. Board of Riley County Comm'rs, 81 Kan. 548, 106 Pac. 297 (1910);
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If a dedication was made for a specific and defined purpose, however,
there is no power in the legislature, the municipality, or the general public
to use the park for purposes other than those designated,' 0 no matter
whether the intended use is public or privaten or whether the dedication
was common law or statutory in origin.' 2 Many courts reach this result
both when the fee is held by the municipality and when it remains in the
grantor.' 3 If a change of purpose is desired, eminent domain provides
the only solution.' 4 By accepting the dedication, the municipality becomes a trustee to carry out its terms.' 5
Some courts, however, place a more liberal construction upon a dedication made for a specific and defined purpose when the fee is granted
absolutely to the municipality. In such a case they hold that, if the
legislature so authorizes, the use may be discontinued or applied in any
manner.' 0 The same result is reached by these courts as is reached by
the majority of courts in cases in which the land is dedicated without re7

strictions.1
When a governmental unit acquires property in fee by mneans other
than by dedication and the property is subsequently dedicated by the
legislature for use as a public park, such use can be discontinued by still
later legislation.' s The legislature does not purport to deprive itself of
Lowell v. Boston, 322 Mass. 709, 79 N. E.2d 713 (1948); Fort Worth v. Burnett, 131
Tex. 190, 114 S. W.2d 220 (1938).
"'Hall v. Fairchild-Gilmore-Wilton Co., 66 Cal. App. 615, 227 Pac. 649 (1924);
Carstens v. City of Wood River, 332 I1.400, 163 N. E. 816 (1928) ; Chicago v. Ward,
169 Ill. 392, 48 N. E. 927 (1897); Codman v. Crocker, 203 Mass. 146, 89 N. E.
177 (1909); Jones v. City of Jackson, 104 Miss. 449, 61 So. 456 (1913); Hyland v.
City of Eugene, 179 Ore. 567, 173 P.2d 464 (1946).
11
Lutterloh v. Cedar Keys, 15 Fla. 306 (1875); Gaskins v. Williams, 235 Mo. 563,
139 S. W. 117 (1911).
"2Baird v. Recreation Comm'rs of South Orange, 108 N. J. Eq. 91, 154 At. 204
(1931); Grady v. Greenville, 129 S. C. 89, 123 S. E. 494 (1924).
2'See note 10 supra.
'Donalson v. Georgia Power & Light Co., 175 Ga. 462, 165 S. E. 440 (1932); Codman v. Crocker, 203 Mass. 146, 89 N. E. 177 (1909); Louisville & N. R. R. v. Cincinnati, 76 Ohio St. 481, 81 N. E. 983 (1907); Fort Worth v. Burnett, 131 Tex. 190,
114 S. W.2d 220 (1938).
"8Hyland v. City of Eugene, 179 Ore. 567, 173 P.2d. 464 (1946); Fort Worth v.
Burnett, 131 Tex. 190, 114 S. W.2d 220 (1938).
"Van Ness v. Mayor of Washington, 4 Pet. 232 (U. S. 1822); Ritzman v. Los
Angeles, 38 Cal. App.2d 470, 101 P.2d 541 (1940); 3 McQunxLAN, MumCixA CoPORAiONS §1155 (2d ed. 1928).
2'See note 9 supra.
13
Spinks v. Los Angeles, 220 Cal. 366, 31 P.2d 193 (1934); Wright v. Walcott, 238
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